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Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical model in which inequality affects per capita income when in-
dividuals decide to accumulate human capital depending on their life expectancy. The model as-
sumes that life expectancy depends to a large extent on the environment in which individuals grow
up, in particular, on the human capital of their parents. After calibrating the life expectancy func-
tion according to the international evidence for cross-section data, our results show the existence
of multiple steady states depending on the initial distribution of education. In particular, human
capital may converge towards different stable steady states. In accordance with the evidence dis-
played by many developing countries, the low steady state is a poverty trap in which children are
raised in poor families, have a low life expectancy and work as non-educated workers all their
lives.
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1. Introduction
Since the last decade there has appeared an increasing body of literature that analyzes
the influence that inequality in the distribu t i o no fi n c o m eo rw e a l t hm a ye x e r to ne c o -
nomic growth and income differentials across countries. The complexity of the relation-
ship between inequality and growth has led theoretical models to look at this problem
in different ways. Broadly, the literature has focused on two mechanisms through which
inequality may influence growth.2 The first mechanism can be called the fiscal policy
∗ R. Doménech gratefully acknowledges the financial support of CICYT grant SEC99-0820. Ad-
dress for comments: Amparo Castelló Climent, Universidad Jaume I, 12071 Castellón, Spain. e-mail:
acastell@eco.uji.es and rafael.domenech@uv.es.
2 Benabou (1996) or Aghion, Caroli and García-Peñalosa (1999) survey this literature.
-1-approach and has been analyzed by Bertola (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994) or Pers-
son and Tabellini (1994), among others. The main idea behind these models is that, in
the political process, economies with greater inequality in the distribution of wealth will
vote for greater redistributive policies than those with a more even distribution. If such
redistributive policies are financed with distortionary taxes affecting human and physi-
cal capital accumulation rates, the more unequal societies will experience lower growth
rates. The second kind of models have the common assumption of incomplete credit
markets, an approach started with the pioneer model of Galor and Zeira (1993).3 In this
model, the assumption of non-convexities in the accumulation of human capital jointly
w i t hi m p e r f e c tc r e d i tm a r k e t sm e a n st h a ti n d ividuals who inherit an amount lower than
a threshold level do not invest in human capital and work as unskilled workers. There-
fore, in this model initial distribution of wealth is crucial in determining the long-term
human capital and income levels, since the higher the number of individuals below the
threshold level, the lower the average accumulation rate of the economy.
This paper explores an alternative channel through which inequality in the distri-
bution of human capital may influence the process of human capital accumulation. This
new mechanism is based on the relationship between human capital distribution, life ex-
pectancy and the accumulation of human capital.
Some models that have analyzed the relationship between demography and de-
velopment have noticed the important role played by life expectancy in determining the
optimal education decisions of individuals. For example, Ehrlich and Lui (1991) focus
on a theoretical model that links longevity, fertility and economic growth to explain the
“demographic transition”. In their overlapping generation model, a sufficient exogenous
increase in longevity promotes economic growth as well as reduces fertility rates. In a
similar model, Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) endogenize life expectancy. As a result,
their model generates multiple development regimes depending on initial conditions.
Endogenizing life expectancy allows Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) to explain jointly
the main changes that take place during the demographic transition of economies, such
as greater life expectancy, higher levels of education, lower fertility and later timing of
births.4
3 Models that relate distribution and growth under the presence of imperfect credit markets in-
clude Banerjee and Newman (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997) or Piketty (1997).
4 De la Croix and Licandro (1999) and Kalmeli-Ozcan, Ryder and Weil (2000), among others,
have developed continuous time overlapping generations models in which optimal schooling in-
vestment decisions depend positively on life expectancy. In addition, the important role that life
expectancy can play in models with endogenous fertility rates and human capital investment de-
cisions is also revealed in the recent papers of Kalemli-Ozcan (2001), Soares (2001) and Tamura
(2002).
-2-The main purpose of this paper is to include endogenous life expectancy in a
model populated by heterogeneous agents. In our model individuals live for two pe-
riods and differ in their second period survival probability. In particular, we consider
that life expectancy is conditioned by the human capital of the families which individu-
als are born into, an assumption supported by the empirical evidence (see, among others,
Case, Lubostky and Paxon, 2001). Given their expected survival probabilities, individ-
uals choose the optimal time devoted to becoming educated in order to maximize their
intertemporal utility.
The survival probability function is calibrated according to the data and, as a re-
sult, the model shows multiple steady states.5 In particular, the time individuals devote
to human capital accumulation converges towards two steady states: poor individuals
converge to a low steady state and rich individual converge to a high steady state. Con-
sequently, the initial distribution of wealth determines the long-term average human ca-
pital and the average income in the economy. The fewer the number of individuals with
education lower than a threshold level, the greater the average human capital and aver-
a g ei n c o m ei nt h ee c o n o m y .
Although the policy implications we obtain are similar to those of Galor and Zeira
(1993), the underlying assumptions of the models are quite different. In their model the
assumptions of imperfect credit markets and indivisibilities in human capital investment
are crucial for the results. In our model, the results are mainly due to the assumption
of differences in the survival probabilities among individuals. Hence, in Galor and Zeira
(1993) model, poor individuals would invest more human capital if capital markets were
perfect. In our model, even with perfect capital markets, poor individuals invest a low
amount of human capital since their low life expectancy increases their opportunity cost
of becoming educated.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 displays the basic structure of
the model. Section 3 calibrates the model and analyses the relation between inequality
and growth. Finally, Section 4 presents the conclusions reached.
2. The model
In this section we present a very simple model to analyze the relationship between in-
5 Other models with heterogeneous agents that generate multiple steady states, without assum-
ing non-convexities in the production process, are the recent papers of Moav (2001) or Eicher
and García-Peñalosa (2001). In Moav (2001), parents face a trade-off between child quality and
child quantity. The endogenous fertility choice in this model results in multiple steady states. In
Eicher and García-Peñalosa (2001), the key assumption for the existence of multiple steady states is
the interdependence of supply and demand for skilled workers under skilled-biased technological
change. Azariadis (2001) offers an excellent survey on the literature about poverty traps.
-3-equality, life expectancy and growth. For thi sp u r p o s ew ec o n s i d e ra no v e r l a p p i n gg e n -
eration model in which individuals can live at most for two periods. The probability of
living during the whole first period is one, whereas the probability of living until the end
of the second period is πt+1.A tt h ee n do ft h ef i r s tp e r i o de ach individual gives birth
to another such that all individuals have a descendent. In every period the economy
produces a single good that is used for consumption.
2.1 Life expectancy
The economy is populated by individuals that differ in their family wealth but that are
identical in their preferences and innate abilities. We assume that an individual's life
expectancy will depend on the economic status of the family which the individual is
born into.
The empirical evidence shows a negative association between socioeconomic status
and mortality. Marmot et al. (1991) found in the Whitehall II study a positive association
between the grade of employment of British civil servants and their health status, a result
already obtained in the first Whitehall study initiated in 1967. More recently, using data
for the United States, Deaton and Paxon (1999) have found that higher income is asso-
ciated with lower mortality, whereas Lleras-Muney (2002) findings reveal that education
has a large negative causal effect on mortality.
Some papers have also suggested that this relation is not linear. Smith (1999)
analyses the relation between individuals' health and their income or wealth using the
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) for 12,000 American individuals. He estimates an
order probit model with self reported health status as the dependent variable.6 The re-
sults show that the relationship between self reported health and income or wealth is
non-linear, and that the positive and statistically significant effect of income and wealth
on self reported health status decreases as socioeconomic status increases.
However, Case, Lubotsky and Paxon (2001) suggest that the gradient, that is, the
positive association between health and socioeconomic status, has its origins in child-
hood. They provide evidence of a positive relationship between household income and
child health. Likewise, Currie and Hyson (1999) find that being born into low socioeco-
nomic status family increases the probability of reporting poor health at age 23 and 33.
Other studies also show that parents' education has a positive impact on child height,
which may be used as an indicator of long-run health status, even after controlling for
parents' income (see, for example, Thomas, Strauss and Henriques, 1990 and 1991).
On this matter, there are medical studies that point out the important role that the
environment plays during pregnancy and on newborn children in determining the fu-
6 Smith, Taylor and Sloan (2001), using the HRS, find that subjective perceptions of mortality are
good predictors of observed mortality.
-4-ture diseases and illnesses which an individual may suffer from. For example, Ravelli
et al. ( 1 9 9 8 )i n v e s t i g a t eg l u c o s et o l e r a n c ei np e o p l eb o r na r o u n dt h et i m eo ff a m i n ei n
the Netherlands during 1944-1945. They found that prenatal exposure to famine, mainly
during late gestation, was associated to decreased glucose tolerance in adults increasing
the risk of diabetes. Barker (1997) focuses on the “fetal origins” hypothesis which states
that human fetuses change their physiology and metabolisms in order to adapt to a lim-
ited supply of nutrients. These programmed changes may be the origins of a number of
diseases in later life such as hypertension, coronary heart disease, strokes and diabetes.
The foregoing results suggest that it is realistic to assume that individuals born
into rich families will have higher life expectancy than those born into poor families,
who are more likely to be affected by undernourishment during early stages of life and
an unhealthier environment during childhood, for instance, lower standards of hygiene
at home, an unhealthier diet or less use of preventive and curative medical services.
Moreover, we consider that the positive effect that family income may exert on an indi-
vidual life expectancy decreases as income increases and vanishes at high income levels.
In particular, as human capital is one of the main determinants of income and wealth,
we assume that parents' human capital will determine the survival probability of their
children. Thus, we consider a positive but decreasing effect of parents' human capital
o nt h el i f ee x p e c t a n c yo ft h e i rd e s c e n d a n t s .T h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fa ni n d i v i d u a li born in
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it is the human capital of the parent. In the next section we use a specific equa-
tion for the survival probability according to the empirical evidence of the relationship
between life expectancy and schooling years. Given that the evidence is only available
for schooling years, throughout the paper we make the survival probability depend on
parents' schooling years instead of a broad concept of human capital.
2.2 Technology
In the first period of life individuals are endowed with one unit of time. They allocate
Li




where A is a function of the level of technology and other production inputs and 0 ≤
Lt
it ≤ 1. For simplicity, we consider that A is constant.
Individuals allocate the remaining units of their time (1 − Li
t) towards acquiring
-5-formal education for the second period according to the function:
ht
it+1 = θ(1 − Lt
it) (3)
where θ i st h en u m b e ro fy e a r so ft h ef i r s tp e r i o da n dht
it+1 the schooling years that
individual i accumulates when young.
In the second period of life, individuals allocate all their time endowment to the






it+1 =1 . Thus, the higher the human capital stock accumulated during the first
period the higher the income produced in the second period. The specification of the
production function in the second period relies on the work of Mincer (1974), since it
relates the log of income to schooling years
lnyt
it+1 =l nA + αht
it+1 (5)
Therefore, the coefficient α can be interpreted as the return of education.
2.3 Preferences








The expected lifetime utility is defined over consumption when young (ct
it) and con-
sumption when old (ct
it+1), where the second period utility is discounted for the en-
dogenous survival probability πt
it+1(ht−1
it ) a n df o rt h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c eρ,w h e r e
γ =1 /(1 + ρ).
During the first period, agents can finance their consumption with two types of
income. The first one is given by the production of goods (yt
it) which, as equation (2)
states, is a function of the time devoted to production. During the time they invest in
e d u c a t i o n ,w ea s s u m et h e yh a v ea c c e s st oam i n i m u mi n c o m ep e rs c h o o l i n gy e a r .T h u s ,
the level of consumption in t is given by
ct
it = yt
it + βA(1 − Lt
it) (7)
where β is a parameter, such that 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, which determines the revenue that cov-
ers the consumption while this agent is attending school, net of all education cost. For
simplicity, we assume that β is exogenous and that this revenue increases with A,t h a t
is, consumption during education years is higher in economies with higher A. In most
-6-economies, the revenue financing consumption whereas attending to school, which is
thus proportional to (1 − Lt
it), is jointly financed by parents and public policies such as
grants. Theoretical models usually incorporate bequests as a basic resource for financing
education years. However, as long as bequests are a function of parents' incomes, this
constitutes an important channel through which the human capital of parents affects the
human capital of their descendants. Since we are interested in analyzing these effects
exclusively through the endogenous life expectancy, it is convenient to assume that indi-
viduals can substitute intertemporally some income, proportional to the time they invest
in education but independent from the schooling years of their parents. Thus, if β =0
the intertemporal substitution of income for education is not allowed and welfare during
the first period is entirely determined by yt
it.
In the second period, total income is used to finance private consumption and to










For simplicity, we are assuming that the intertemporal substitution of income, which is
only allowed for education, occurs at no cost. However, equation (8) takes into account
the fact that individuals may not live the whole second period. As βA(1−Lt
it) appears
in equation (8) divided by the endogenous survival probability, agents pay back all this
income independently of the number of years they live in the second period.
As we show below, agents with no probability of living during the second period,
because the human capital of their parents is so low, will not allocate any fraction of their
time to acquiring education. At the other extreme, if πt
it+1(ht−1
it )=1 ,t h e n(1 − Lt
it)
will reach its maximum value. In other word, the time individuals devote to education
will be a function of the schooling years of their parents, but exclusively through the
endogenous life expectancy since intergenerational transfers are nonexistent.
2.4 Optimal education years
The optimal behavior of agents is to choose the amount of human capital that maxi-
mizes their intertemporal utility function. Thus, individual i chooses the time devoted
to schooling (1−Lt
it) that maximizes (6) subject to the production functions (2) and (4),
the accumulation of human capital (3), the budget restrictions (7) and (8), and the non
negativity and inequality restrictions (0 ≤ Lt
it ≤ 1).
For 0 ≤ Lt
it ≤ 1, the first order condition for this problem gives place to a non-
linear function of Lt
it in terms of ht−1






































As we show below, the time individuals devote to accumulating human capital increases
with their second period survival probability, which is a function of parents' human ca-
pital. Since the income in the second period depends on the time agents devote to ac-
cumulating human capital, the longer they expect to live the greater their human capital
investment.
3. Inequality and Growth
In this section we analyze the relationship between inequality in the distribution of ed-
ucation, life expectancy, human capital accumulation and per capita income. Firstly, we
calibrate the model. Then, we display the numerical results of the evolution of human
capital over time. Finally, we explore how inequality may affect life expectancy, human
capital and growth.
3.1 Calibration
To analyze the influence that inequality in the distribution of human capital exerts on the
process of development, following Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), we assume a specific
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and it is bounded by π and π since
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it )=π ≤ 1 (13)
Apart from its theoretical properties, at the empirical level this function captures
very well the relationship between life expectancy and human capital across countries,
for appropriate values of its parameters. We rely on aggregate data since micro data
relating parents' education with offspring life expectancy for a broad number of countries
are not available. Figure 1 shows the dispersion between life expectancy at birth in 1985,
taken from the World Bank, and the average schooling years for the population 25 years
old and over in 1960, from Barro and Lee (2001). The different reference years for these
two variables try to capture our assumption that the survival probability in t +1of the
generation born in t i saf u n c t i o no ft h eh u m a nc a p i t a lo fg e n e r a t i o nb o r ni nt−1.7 This
figure shows a clear concave relationship between the stock of human capital and life
expectancy.8 The fitted function in Figure 1 is obtained assuming that θ =4 0 , π =0 ,
π =1 .0,$=0 .5 and φ =1 .4. Given these parameters, agents have a life expectancy of
40 years if their parents have no schooling. Since the model considers two equal periods
we assume a duration of 40 years for every period.
With regard to the production function a reasonable value for α is 0.07, since its
estimated values usually range from 0.05 to 0.15 depending on the sample (see Krueger
and Lindahl, 2001). We also assume a standard value for the rate of time preference, ρ,
equal to 0.02,w h i c hg i v e sav a l u eo f0.4529 for γ,s i n c eθ =4 0 . Finally, β is calibrated
to 0.18, in order to obtain a high steady state in which the years of education are equal
to 16, that is, the average of the maximum number of years of formal education in OECD
countries (see De la Fuente and Doménech, 2001). With these parameter values the model
is capable of generating multiple steady states. Nevertheless, we also explore how the
changes in these parameters affect the properties of the model.
3.2 The evolution of human capital
Equation (9) summarizes the dynamics of the model across generations and it is repre-
7 Life expectancy at birth is defined as the number of years a newborn infant would live if pre-
vailing patterns of mortality at the time of birth were to remain the same throughout its life. Since
life expectancy has been increasing almost during recent decades, the prevailing patterns of mortal-
ity in 1960 changed in 1970 and so on. Therefore, life expectancy in 1985 also proxies the mortality
patterns in 1985 of people born before this year.
8 T h ec o n c a v es h a p eh o l d sw i t ht h ed i f f e r e n ta v a i l a b l ey e a r si nt h es a m p l e .I na d d i t i o n ,i n f a n t
mortality relates negatively at a decreasing rate with the stock of human capital. The relationship
between infant mortality and the stock of human capital may proxy the relationship between the
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Figure 1: Life expectancy in 1985 versus average years of schooling in 1960, 92 countries.
sented in Figure 2, given the values of the parameters discussed above and the prop-
erties of the first order condition (see Appendix 2). As we can observe, the number of
years devoted to the education increases with the human capital of the parents, except
for low values of ht−1
it where ht
it+1 is equal to zero. The economy exhibits three differ-
ent steady states: there are two low steady states with values of zero and around 3.5
years of schooling, and a high steady state of 16 years of schooling. However, since
ht−1
it = ht
it+1 =3 .5 is not a stable steady state, the dynamics of the model involve that
individuals with parents having less than 3.5 years of education (that is, primary edu-
cation not completed) will converge to the lowest steady state with no schooling.9
9 S o m ee m p i r i c a lp a p e r sg i v ee v i d e n c ei nf a v o u ro fm u l t i p l es t e a d ys t a t e sm o d e l s .F o re x a m p l e ,
Quah (1993a, b, 1996) uses annual transitional matrix methodology to estimate long-run tendencies
of incomes across countries. His findings suggest a polarization, instead of convergence, across the
world incomes. Kremer et al. (2001) estimate transition probabilities over five-year intervals rather
than annual intervals. Their resulting ergodic distribution gives a mass of 72 per cent of countries
in the richest income category. However, they obtain that the transition to this steady state is very
slow. In addition, if recent trends in international income mobility continue, their results predict
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Figure 2: Human capital dynamics.
In Figure 3 we present the sensitivity of human capital steady states to changes
in the different parameters of our model. As expected, an increase in the revenues to fi-
nance consumption in the first period (i.e., an increase in β) results in an upward shift of
the function relating human capital of the two generations. It can be shown that, given
the calibrated values of the other parameters, when β =0the model exhibits only one
steady state in which ht−1
it = ht
it+1 =0 , which can be interpreted as a credit market re-
striction for the whole economy. Our model can be seen as a generalization of Galor and
Zeira's (1993) one when β is allowed to vary among individuals. For example, individu-
als born into poor families with no education have no collateral and are restricted in the
credit market, in a situation which is equivalent to β =0 . However, in our model even
if β > 0 poor individuals do not invest in education because their low life expectancy
increases their opportunity cost of becoming educated. Therefore, the model predicts
multiple steady states even when the intertemporal substitution of income is possible.
An increase in the returns of education or in the life horizon (α and θ, respectively)
and a reduction of the rate of time preference (ρ)a l s op r o d u c e sa nu p w a r ds h i f to ft h e
function since the investment in education is more profitable. Finally, an increase of the
survival probability for any given level of ht−1
it , through higher φ or ω, creates more
-11-education incentives.
Figure 2 makes clear that individuals who are born into poor families with low
levels of education (ht−1
it ' 0) will have a low survival probability (πi
t+1(ht−1
it ) ' 0) and,
therefore, have no incentives to accumulate human capital (ht
it+1 ' 0), devoting all their
time to working in the production sector (Li
t =1 ), with a low productivity. This low
s t e a d ys t a t ei sf o u n di ns o m eL a t i nA m e r i c a n ,A f r i c a no rS o u t hA s i a nc o u n t r i e s ,i nw h i c h
many children born into poor families, with no education, live for a short period of life,
have no access to education and work as unskilled workers from childhood, affecting a
large share of the world population. Using Barro and Lee (2001) data for 2000, at least 20
per cent of the population 15 years old and over was illiterate in 50 of the 108 countries in
the sample. In 25 of these countries, at least 40 per cent of the population was illiterate.
T h es h a r eo ft h ep o p u l a t i o nw i t hn oe d u c a t i o ni s8 0p e r c e n ti nM a l ia n dN i g e r ,w h e r e
the life expectancy at birth is 43 and 46 years, respectively.
The dynamics of the model predict that governments could bring these families
out of the no schooling poverty trap if they guarantee access to a minimum level of
education for some generations and increase life expectancy.
3.3 Human capital distribution, life expectancy and economic growth
In accordance with the previous results, in this model the initial distribution of wealth
will determine the long-run average human capital and average income in the economy.
Given the simplifying assumptions we have made the model does not exhibit endoge-
nous growth in the steady states, but it is useful to explain one source of the per capita
income differentials across countries. Thus ,t h ef e w e rt h en u m b e ro fi n d i v i d u a l sw i t h
education lower than the threshold level, the greater the average human capital and av-
e r a g ei n c o m ei nt h ee c o n o m y .
Under the assumption of imperfect credit markets and indivisibilities in human
capital investment, Galor and Zeira (1993) obtain similar results. In their model the ini-
tial distribution of wealth determines the share of the population with no education that
works as unskilled workers. Likewise, their model also shows the possibility of two
steady states, a low steady state with unskilled workers and a high one with skilled
workers. However, the underlying assumptions of their models are quite different to
ours. In Galor and Zeira's model, the assumption of imperfect credit markets causes
that the distribution of wealth influences economic activity in the short term, and indi-
visibilities in human capital investment are crucial in order to preserve these results in
the long run. In contrast, the results of our model are mainly due to the assumption that
differences in the survival probabilities among individuals are a function of their parents'
human capital.
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ω=0.65
ω=0.35
Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis of human capital steady states to changes in the benchmark









































Figure 4: Average survival probability and human capital equality index (ht−1
pt /ht−1
rt ).
that the initial distribution of education matters a great deal for the evolution of the av-
e r a g eh u m a nc a p i t a li nt h ee c o n o m y .I tc a nb ee a s i l ys h o w nt h a t ,g i v e nt w oc o u n t r i e s
with the same average human capital stock in one period, the country with the greater
inequality will exhibit lower average survival probability and, therefore, a lower stock
of human capital in the following period. Assuming that the economy is populated by
af r a c t i o nλ =0 .2 of rich individuals, denoted by r,a n daf r a c t i o n(1−λ) of poor indi-
viduals, denoted by p, in Figure 4 we have represented the average survival probability,
for two economies with averages of 5 and 6 schooling years, as a function of the equal-








As we can observe, for an equality index higher than 0.4 the average survival probability
increases very slowly, but when the index is below 0.4, this probability decreases rapidly
as the distribution of human capital becomes more unequal.
The empirical evidence supports this implication of the model. Using the cali-
brated function for the survival probability, we have estimated the following equation
-14-Table 1














t-ratios in parenthesis. * restricted parameter.
for a sample of 92 countries:
LEi,1985 = θmin +( θmax − θmin)πi,1985(hi,1960)+µGhi,1960 (15)
where i refers to the different countries in the sample, the dependent variable is the life
expectancy in 1985 (from the World Bank), h is measured as the average years of school-
ing in 1960 (from Barro and Lee, 2001) and Gh is the Gini coefficient of human capital
in 1960 taken from Castelló and Doménech (2002), in deviations from the sample aver-
age. The estimated value of θmin is the life expectancy of a country where πi(hi)=0
and the Gini coefficient is equal to the sample average. The equation also includes two
dummy variables d1 (Lesotho, Malawi, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Bolivia ) and
d2 (Tunisia, Iraq, Kuwait and Portugal) which control for outliers, since their residu-
als exceed in more than two times the estimated standard error of the residuals. Since
the endogenous variable is dated in 1985 and the regressors in 1960 we avoid possible
endogeneity problems in this regression. The results of the estimation of equation (15)
by OLS are presented in Table 1. In column (1) we regress LE on a constant and Gh,
which in equation (15) is equivalent to impose that θmax = θmin,w h e r e a si nc o l u m n( 2 )
we introduce π as an additional regressor. In both specifications, the Gini coefficient of
human capital has a negative and statistically significant effect on life expectancy, con-




























Figure 5: The dynamics of schooling years as a function of the initial distribution
of human capital, characterized by the equality index.
unequal distribution of human capital will exhibit lower life expectancy. The results in
Table 1 also show that the Gini coefficient and our calibrated function for the survival
probability, both dated in 1960, explain a large variance (86.7 per cent) of life expectancy
across countries.
As the distribution of human capital affects the average life expectancy of the
economy, inequality will also have a negative effect on the steady state level of average
schooling years and, therefore, on the growth rate of the economy during the transition
to the steady state. In Figure 5 we have illustrated this implication of the model. Let us
assume again that the economy is populated by a fraction λ =0 .2 of rich individuals
and a fraction (1 − λ) of poor individuals, such that the average human capital of the
economy is given by
ht = λht−1
r,t +( 1− λ)ht−1
p,t (16)
For a starting level of schooling ht there are different combinations ht−1
r,t and ht−1
p,t satisfy-
ing this condition, with important implications on the distribution of human capital. For
example, if human capital is perfectly distributed then ht−1
r,t = ht−1
p,t = ht and et =1 .
On the contrary, if the human capital of rich individuals is the high steady sate level,
-16-such that ht−1






I nF i g u r e5w eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tht is equal to 5 years, above the unstable steady state,
and we have simulated the dynamics of the average human capital, using equation (9) for
the two groups of individuals and different initial distributions, which are characterized
by the equality index. Given the calibrated values of the parameters, the steady state
is reached after five generations or even less. Economies with a low inequality index




p,t+j =1 6and the transition is more
rapid the higher the equality in the initial distribution of human capital. In contrast,
when et ≤ 0.34the average human capital reach very quickly a low steady state in
which h
t+j−1
r,t+j =1 6and h
t+j−1
p,t+j =0 . Therefore, the distribution of human capital has
outstanding effects upon the economic prospects of societies.
4. Conclusions
This paper has analyzed an alternative mechanism which explains why inequality in the
distribution of income or wealth may be harmful for human capital accumulation. The
underlying mechanism is based on the assumption that the life expectancy of individuals
is somehow conditioned by the socioeconomic status of the family which they are born
into. In particular, we have assumed that life expectancy is an increasing function of
the human capital of the parents, an assumption strongly supported by the empirical
evidence.
Based on this assumption the paper develops an overlapping generation model in
which individuals live for sure during their first period of life and face an endogenous
probability of surviving the whole second period. Given this probability, they choose the
amount of time devoted to accumulating human capital that maximizes their intertem-
poral utility. As expected, the results show that the time individuals devote to schooling
increases with their expected survival probability.
To analyze the relationship between inequality and growth we have simulated a
life expectancy function according to the data of schooling years provided by Barro and
Lee (2001). The empirical evidence shows a clear relationship between average schooling
y e a r sa c r o s sc o u n t r i e s .G i v e nt h ec a l i b r a t e ds urvival probability function, the model ex-
hibits multiple steady states depending on initial conditions. Rich individuals, born into
families whose parents have high levels of education, have high life expectancy. Their
long life expectancy encourages them to spend a large number of years in education.
On the contrary, individuals who are born into poor families have low life expectancy.
-17-Accordingly, since the time they expect to benefit from the returns to education is very
short, they devote little time to accumulating human capital.
These results imply that the initial distribution of education determines the evo-
lution of the aggregate variables in the model. In particular, the model also shows that
inequality may have negative effects upon t h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h ee c o n o m yd u r i n gt h e
transition to the steady state. The policy implications of the model suggest that gov-
ernments could bring individuals out of the no schooling poverty trap if they guarantee
a minimum compulsory level of education for some generations. Measures that, at the
same time, would generate longer average life expectancy and higher standard of living
in the less developed economies in the medium and long-term.
5. Bibliography
Aghion, P. and P. Bolton (1997): “A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development”. Review of
Economic Studies, 64, 151-172.
Aghion, P., E. Caroli and C. García-Peñalosa (1999): “Inequality and Economic Growth: the Pers-
pective of the New Growth Theories”. Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 1615-1660.
Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994): “Distributive Politics and Economic Growth”. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 109, 465-490.
Azariadis C. (2001): “The Theory of Poverty Traps: What Have we Learned”.M i m e o ,U C L A .
Banerjee, A. V. and A. F. Newman (1993): “Occupational Choice and the Process of Development”.
Journal of Political Economy, 101(2), 274-298.
Barker, D. (1997): “Maternal Nutrition, Fetal Nutrition and Diseases in Later Life”. Nutrition, 13(9),
807-813.
Barro, R. J. and J. W. Lee (2001): “International Data on Educational Attainment Updates and
Implications”. Oxford Economic Papers,3 ,5 4 1 - 6 3 .
Benabou, R. (1996): “Inequality and Growth”. NBER Working Paper 5658.
Bertola, G. (1993): “Factor Shares and Savings in Endogenous Growth”. American Economic Review,
83, 1184-1199.
Blackburn K. and G. P. Cipriani (2002): “A Model of Longevity, Fertility and Growth”. Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 26(2), 187-204.
Case, A. D. Lubotsky and Ch. Paxon (2001): “Economic Status and Health in Childhood: the Ori-
gins of the Gradient”. American Economic Review,f o r t h c o m i n g .
Castelló, A. and R. Doménech (2002): “Human Capital Inequality and Economic Growth: Some
New Evidence”. Economic Journal, 112 (478), 187-200.
Currie, J. and R. Hyson (1999): “Is the Impact of Health Shocks Cushioned by Socioeconomic
Status? The Case of Low Birthweight.” American Economic Review, 89(2), 245-250.
De la Croix, D. and O. Licandro (1999): “Life Expectancy and Endogenous Growth”. Economic
Letters, 65, 255-263.
De la Fuente, A. and R. Doménech (2001): “Human Capital in Growth Regressions: How Much
Difference Does Data Quality Make?”. Economics Department Working Papers No. 262.
OECD.
Deaton A. and Ch. Paxon (1999): “Mortality, Education, Income and Inequality among American
-18-Cohorts”, NBER Working Paper 7140.
Ehrlich I. and F. T. Lui (1991): “Intergenerational Trade, Longevity, and Economic Growth”. Journal
of Political Economy, 99, 1029-1059.
Eicher, T. O. and C. García-Peñalosa (2001): “Inequality and Growth: the Dual Role of Human
Capital in Development”. Journal of Development Economics, 66, 173-197.
Galor, O. and J. Zeira (1993): “Income Distribution and Macroeconomics”. Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 60, 35-52.
K a l e m l i - O z c a n ,S .,H .E .R y d e ra n dD .N .W e i l( 2 0 0 0 ) :“Mortality Decline, Human Capital Invest-
ment and Economic Growth”. Journal of Development Economics, 62, 1-23.
Kalemli-Ozcan, D. (2001): “Does Mortality Decline Promote Economic Growth?”.M i m e o ,U n i v e r -
sity of Houston.
Kremer, M., A. Onatski and J. Stock (2001): “Searching for Prosperity”.N B E RW o r k i n gP a p e r ,N o .
8520.
Krueger, A. B. and M. Lindahl (2001): “Education for Growth: Why and for Whom?”. Journal of
Economic Literature, 39(4), 1101-1136.
Lleras-Muney, A. (2002): “The Relationship Between Education and Adult Mortality in the United
States”. NBER Working Paper 8986.
Marmot, M. G., G. D. Smith, S. Stansfeld, C. Patel, F. North, J. Head, I. White, E. Brunner and A.
Feeney. (1991): “Health Inequality Among British Civil Servants: the Whitahall II Study”.
The Lancet, 337, 1387-1393.
Mincer, J. (1974): Schooling, Experience and Earnings. Columbia University Press.
Moav, O. (2001): “Cheap Children and the Persistence of Poverty”. CEPR Discussion Paper Series,
No. 3059.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1994): “Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? Theory and Evidence”.
American Economic Review, 84, 600-621.
Piketty, T. (1997): “The Dynamics of the Wealth Distribution and the Interest Rate with Credit
Rationing”. Review of Economic Studies, 64, 173-189.
Quah, D. (1993a): “Empirical Cross-Section Dynamics in Economic Growth”. European Economic
Review, 37, 426-434.
Quah, D. (1993b): “Galton's Fallacy and Test of the Convergence Hypothesis”. Scandinavian Journal
of Economics 95(4), 427-443.
Quah, D. (1996): “Empirics for Economic Growth and Convergence”. European Economic Review,
40, 1353-1375.
Ravelli, A., J. van der Meulen, R. Michels, C. Osmond, D. Barker, C. Hales and O. Bleker (1998):
“Glucose Tolerance in Adults after Prenatal Exposure to Famine”. The Lancet, 351, 173-177.
Smith, J. P. (1999): “Healthy Bodies and Thick Wallets: The Dual Relation Between Health and
Economic Status”. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13, 145-166.
Smith, V. K., D. H. Taylor, Jr., and F. A. Sloan (2001): “Longevity Expectations and Death. Can
People Predict Their Own Demise?”. American Economic Review, 91, No. 4, 1126-1134.
Soares, R. R. (2001): “Life Expectancy, Education Attainment, and Fertility Choice”.M i m e o ,U n i -
versity of Chicago.
Tamura, R. (2002): “Human Capital and Economic Development”. Working Paper No. 2002-5, Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
Thomas, D, J. Strauss and M-H. Henriques (1990): “Child Survival, Height for Age and Household
Characteristics in Brazil”. Journal of Development Economics, 33, 197-234.
-19-Thomas, D, J. Strauss and M-H. Henriques (1991): “How does Mother's Education Affect Child
Height?”. Journal of Human Resources, 34(2), 183-211.
6. Appendix 1
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it ≤ 1 (A1.5)









Applying Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the inequality restriction, the first order conditions

















The interior solution (0 <L t



































































it is a decreasing function of the expected survival probability.
7. Appendix 2
Given the values of the parameters for the survival probability function, discussed in
subsection 3.1, when ht−1
it =0then πt
it+1(ht−1
it )=0 ,t h a ti s ,w h e np a r e n t sh a v en o
education, offsprings only live during the first period. In such a case individuals face












it ≤ 1 (A2.3)
If Lt
it were not restricted, the optimal value for Lt
it w o u l dt e n dt oi n f i n i t y . H o w e v e r ,
the restrictions make the optimal value to take the corner solution in which Lt
it =1 .
This means that individuals who do not live in the second period do not accumulate
human capital and devote all their time to work in order to maximize their first period
consumption. The same restriction Lt
it =1applies when ht−1
it is below the threshold
level for which it is not optimal to devote time to education.
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